INTERNAL MEMO — DO NOT SEND

Protest 016: DSC 008 Bridge Deck Thickness — Contract Analysis

Contract No.: 009727
Project: I-405/Brickyard to SR 527 Improvement Project
Bridge: 405/70N-W (NB I-405 to WB SR 522)
Date: February 11, 2026 (revised); updated March 17–18, 2026 with LTR 377 analysis
Prepared by: WSDOT Contract Analysis Team
Subject: Analysis Supporting Denial of Skanska DSC 007/008 Claim — Bridge Deck Thickness
Responding to: LTR 334 (Jan 29, 2026), LTR 359 (Feb 26, 2026), and LTR 377 (Mar 13, 2026)

I. Executive Summary

Skanska’s DSC claim at Bridge 405/70N-W should be denied. The contract explicitly disclaims the accuracy of as-built drawings and requires the Design-Builder to field verify existing dimensions. As-built drawings are classified as Reference Documents under Appendix A1, meaning Skanska relies on them at its own risk. This position is consistent with WSDOT’s prior determination on Vault NW12 (SL9727-079) and is not dependent on the magnitude of any discrepancy.

Primary Finding: TR 2.13.1 is dispositive: “The plans are not guaranteed to be dimensionally accurate or complete. The Design-Builder shall field measure and verify existing dimensions as required for their Work.” GP 1-01.3 and GP 1-02.2 additionally establish that Reference Document reliance is at the Design-Builder’s own risk. Skanska mobilized for a full freeway closure demolition without having verified the deck thickness that TR 2.13.1 required it to verify.

II. Key Facts

III. Controlling Contract Language

TR 2.13.1 (Bridges and Structures — PRIMARY AUTHORITY)

“The plans showing the existing bridges and other structures are located in the As Builts (Appendix N). The plans are not guaranteed to be dimensionally accurate or complete. The Design-Builder shall field measure and verify existing dimensions as required for their Work.”

This provision is dispositive on three levels: (1) it explicitly disclaims dimensional accuracy of as-built drawings, (2) it places the obligation to verify on the Design-Builder, and (3) it allocates the risk of dimensional variations to the Design-Builder. The contract does not carve out demolition from “their Work.” Demolition planning requires knowing what you are removing.

Reference Document Provisions

Appendix N2 (Bridge As-Builts) is designated “R” (Reference Document) in Appendix A1.

GP 1-01.3: “Reference Documents are for information purposes only and the Design-Builder shall rely upon Reference Documents at its own risk.”

GP 1-02.2: “Unless stated otherwise in the Contract, the Design-Builder is not entitled to rely on the Reference Documents. WSDOT shall not be responsible or liable in any respect for any loss, damage, cost, or expense whatsoever suffered by the Design-Builder… by reason of any use of any information contained in… Reference Documents.”

Site Investigation Obligation

GP 1-02.4(1): The Design-Builder has “reviewed all Contract and Reference Documents provided by WSDOT; inspected and examined the Site… sufficient to familiarize itself with surface and subsurface conditions.” “The Design-Builder is solely responsible for all Site conditions discoverable from a reasonable Site examination.”

This provision uses “conclusive evidence” language and is not limited to surface-visible conditions. It requires the proposer to have undertaken “other appropriate activities” to become familiar with conditions. The appropriate activity was coring or below-deck measurement, and the access mechanism existed under ITP Section 2.6.

IV. Precedent: Vault NW12 (SL9727-079)

On February 21, 2025, WSDOT denied Skanska’s Vault NW12 claim citing GP 1-01.3 and GP 1-02.2 (as-builts are Reference Documents; reliance at DB’s own risk). DSC 007/008 presents an even stronger case for denial because:

• Same Reference Document disclaimers apply, plus
• TR 2.13.1 provides an explicit disclaimer specific to bridge as-builts, plus
• TR 2.13.1 imposes an affirmative obligation to field verify bridge dimensions

V. LTR 377 Supplemental Protest — Response Analysis

A. Type (b) DSC Argument

Skanska pursues Type (b) under GP 1-04.7: “physical conditions of an unusual nature, differing materially from those ordinarily encountered.”

WSDOT counter: Bridge overlays are not unusual. A 1996 overlay on a 1967 bridge is entirely foreseeable maintenance. Thickness variation falls within the normal range of construction tolerances. GP 1-04.7(a) requires the Design-Builder have “no actual or constructive knowledge” of the condition. The 1996 overlay sheets were in Appendix N02_5. Skanska had constructive knowledge.

B. TR 2.13.1 “Design vs. Demolition” Rebuttal

Skanska argues TR 2.13.1 applies only to “design and fit-up of new construction interfacing with existing elements,” not to “verifying the internal composition of structures being entirely removed.”

WSDOT counter: TR 2.13.1 says “as required for their Work.” It does not carve out demolition. “Dimensions” is not qualified. Demolition planning requires knowing what you are removing — that is part of “their Work.”

C. Form A / Reliance Argument

Skanska argues Form A “addresses general site familiarity and conditions discernible from the surface.” Deck thickness is latent, not surface-discernible.

WSDOT counter: GP 1-02.4(1) certifies examination “sufficient to familiarize itself with surface and subsurface conditions.” Deck composition is a subsurface condition. The provision requires “other appropriate activities” to become familiar with conditions. The appropriate activity was coring or below-deck measurement — and the access mechanism existed under ITP 2.6.

D. The 7.0″ Baseline Flaw (Key Evidentiary Point)

Penhall’s Deck Thickness Mapping uses 7.0″ as the as-built baseline for all spans. This ignores the 1996 overlay documented in Appendix N02_5 (pg 83/95), which adds approximately 1.5″ to the total deck thickness. The corrected baseline is 8.0″–8.5″.

Penhall’s entire cost and schedule analysis is built on an inflated baseline. The 192 CY extra volume calculation is overstated because it uses 7.0″ instead of 8.0″–8.5″ as the comparison point.

E. M&M Memo Significance

The Modjeski and Masters structural verification memo (February 9, 2026) is the most significant piece of evidence in LTR 377, and it undermines Skanska’s own case.

• Cost impact weakened: Demolition methodology did not change. The $235,000 “5% removal increase” is not supported by a methodology change. Engineering costs ($38,500) are real but produced no actionable changes.
• Schedule impact weakened: 34-day claim: 28 days are engineering re-evaluation. Re-evaluation concluded no changes needed. Remaining 3.5 days of “additional demolition time” is minimal.
• Skanska submitted this themselves: They cannot claim the deck thickness fundamentally changed their demolition approach when their own engineer says it did not.

F. Verification Methods Analysis

LTR 377 frames verification as requiring “destructive testing on an active interstate structure” and asserts this was “not reasonably feasible.” This is the wrong framing and narrows to one method only.

• Below-deck access: Bridge 405/70N-W has access hatches in the deck structure. Accessing from below requires at most one-lane traffic control. Direct physical measurement of deck thickness from inside the structure is possible.
• Non-destructive methods: NDT methods exist for measuring concrete thickness without coring. These are well-established in bridge inspection practice. (Reserve specific ASTM standards and method names for DRB — do not cite in protest response letter.)
• Strongest framing: The fundamental failure is not choosing the wrong verification method — it is never considering investigation at all. Skanska did not request ROW access under ITP 2.6. Did not evaluate alternative methods. Did not attempt to verify from inside the structure. Did not investigate in any way.

Note on GPR (Hold for DRB):

GPR is weak for concrete-on-concrete interfaces because the dielectric contrast between original concrete and overlay is minimal. Do NOT cite GPR in the protest response letter or suggest it as a viable method. If Skanska raises GPR at DRB, the response is that GPR’s limitations for this application do not excuse failure to consider other methods.

VI. ITP Provisions (Reserved for Protest Response / DRB)

VII. Risk Assessment

Strengths

• TR 2.13.1 is unambiguous: explicit disclaimer + affirmative verification obligation
• Reference Document classification is undisputed: Appendix A1 designation “R” confirmed
• Vault NW12 precedent (SL9727-079): consistent position on same legal grounds
• M&M Memo: Skanska’s own engineer confirms no methodology change required — undermines cost and schedule claims
• 7.0″ baseline flaw: Penhall’s cost analysis overstates discrepancy by ignoring documented 1996 overlay
• Skanska never requested ROW access under ITP 2.6 for bridge investigation
• No TIA submitted; schedule claim is speculative pending PCO 010B resolution
• Claim well below $1.5M DSC threshold

Potential Weaknesses / Risk Items

• DRB equitable sympathy: was pre-bid coring of active I-405 bridge actually practical? Mitigated by ITP §2.6 proving access mechanism existed, and by below-deck access option.
• GP 1-02.2 exception clause: Skanska may argue GP 1-04.7 DSC entitlement supersedes the Reference Document disclaimer. Mitigated by TR 2.13.1 as independent, affirmative ground that exists outside GP 1-02.2.
• Only 12 of 452 retrofit sheets in Appendix N02_5 — Skanska may argue overlay was not adequately disclosed. Counter: page 83/95 of what was provided explicitly shows the overlay detail.
• Core appearance: overlay is not clearly distinguishable as a separate layer in cores. Frame the overlay argument on the documentary record, not on physical appearance in core samples.

VIII. Do-Not-Concede List

• Do not imply WSDOT guaranteed as-built accuracy
• Do not suggest field verification was infeasible or prohibited
• Do not acknowledge any entitlement
• Do not suggest coring was not a reasonable pre-bid investigation method
• Do not deviate from Vault NW12 position (SL9727-079)
• Do not commit to a specific discrepancy magnitude that could be disproven by further coring data
• Do not characterize the overlay inconsistency in ways that undermine the as-built documentation
• Do not cite specific ASTM standards or NDT method names in the protest response letter (reserve for DRB)
• Do not cite GPR as a viable verification method (dielectric contrast limitation)

IX. Open Items