Decision Requested

Issue written determination denying Protest 014 and all four relief requests.

• Recommendation: Deny — ATC-1 text is explicit and self-contained
• Cost Exposure: $1,406,243 (AECOM $1,071,847 + Skanska $334,396)
• Risk Level: Moderate — strengthened by verified source documents (RFIs, RCSR, workshop notes)

Core Question

Does ATC-1 require structural continuity (combined spread footings + pier walls) for the NB405 Bridge 405-103E widening, or did it only replace drilled shafts with spread footings?

ATC-1, titled “228th St Foundation Optimization,” replaced drilled shaft foundations with spread footings at three structures including Bridge 405/103E. Skanska argues the ATC was limited to a foundation swap. WSDOT’s position is that ATC-1 Items 3, 4, and 6 read together describe a unified structural system — combined spread footings and pier walls — that must be replicated for the widening. See Internal Memo Pillar 2 for the full read-together analysis.

ATC-1 Item 3 states that “spread footings will be combined” at the intermediate piers, with “the final design of combining the spread footing and the existing drilled shaft” to be “determined during final design.” Item 6 states the pier diaphragm and pier cap “will be widened to match the existing structure.” WSDOT reads these provisions together with Item 4 (pier wall per Figure 2) as establishing structural continuity. Skanska reads “match” as dimensional compatibility only. See Internal Memo Pillar 2 for the full read-together analysis.

The protest was filed February 20, 2026 (Skanska LTR 356). WSDOT acknowledged the protest and denied the extension request (WSDOT SL 277, Feb 23). The supplemental was received March 6, 2026 (Skanska LTR 370) with AECOM’s 11-page technical narrative and a $1,406,243 cost claim. Written determination due ~March 27, 2026.

Full analysis in the Position Map and Internal Memo (open in viewer panel).

ID	Assertion	WSDOT Position	Strength	Reference
A	ATC-1 scope limited to foundation swap; title says “Foundation Optimization”	Items 3, 4, 6 describe unified structural system; DB Proposal treats widening as given ATC component	Strong	Internal Memo Pillar 1; Position Map LTR356-2a
B	“Match” (Item 6) means dimensional compatibility only	Item 6 “match” + Item 3 “combining” read together require structural integration; dimensional-only renders Item 3 surplusage	Strong	Internal Memo Pillar 2; Position Map LTR356-2b
C	ATC-8 precedent — WSDOT treated ATC figures as non-definitive	Different domain (roadway geometry vs. structural text); ATC-1 position rests on Items 3, 4, 6 text	Moderate	Internal Memo Pillar 3; Position Map LTR356-2e
D	Two-year silence (Apr 2023 – Nov 2025) implies no requirement	No widening submittal during gap; GP 1-04.4(5)(n) assigns ATC costs regardless of timing	Moderate	Internal Memo Pillar 4; Position Map LTR356-2d
E	WSDOT has not provided sufficient technical direction	Direction via SL 201, SL 237, SL 262; ATC-1 Items 3+4 are the technical direction	Strong	Position Map LTR356-2a–2e

Supplemental Assertions (LTR 370, March 6, 2026)

ID	Assertion	WSDOT Position	Strength	Reference
F	Comment #9 closure (Nov 2024) = acceptance of separate substructure	RCSR shows reviewer questioned omission; GP 1-03.7: closing Q&A ≠ endorsement. No DBIC filed	Strong	Internal Memo Pillar 5; Position Map LTR370-2a
G	Changed geotechnical conditions invalidate deep footing rationale	Contract text unchanged by conditions; obligation unconditional. Proper path: DBIC	Strong	Internal Memo Pillar 6; Position Map LTR370-2b
H	BDM 15.2.10 code compliance concerns (in-ground plastic hinges)	Design challenge, not contract interpretation. DB accepted obligation per GP 1-04.4(5)(n)	Strong	Internal Memo Pillar 7; Position Map LTR370-2c
I	Closure pour requires two traffic phases, impacts 228th Ave	Implementation challenge; foreseeable when DB proposed ATC for bridge over live roadway	Strong	Internal Memo Pillar 7; Position Map LTR370-2d
J	Industry practice (Caltrans MTD 9-3, Talbot Road) supports separate substructures	External standards don’t override project-specific contract language	Strong	Internal Memo Pillar 8; Position Map LTR370-2e
K	11 months of good-faith design reliance (Nov 2024 – Oct 2025)	DB had contract text throughout; RFI 461 proves DB knew approach was disputed	Strong	Internal Memo Pillar 5; Position Map LTR370-2f
L	Cost claim: $1,406,243 (AECOM $1,071,847 + Skanska $334,396)	Not entitled; no change occurred. GP 1-04.4(5)(n): ATC costs are DB’s responsibility	Strong	Internal Memo Pillar 9; Position Map LTR370-4
M	Schedule claim: +6 months design, +4 months RFC	Not entitled; no change. GP 1-04.4(5)(n) and (5)(m)	Strong	Internal Memo Pillar 9; Position Map LTR370-5
N	Sonia Berriz statement shows internal WSDOT disagreement	Berriz concluded DB’s design does NOT meet contract requirements — aligns with WSDOT position	Strong	Internal Memo rebuttal; Position Map

Strengths

• ATC-1 text is explicit and self-contained — Item 3 uses “combined”/“combining” and Item 6 uses “match,” both structural-continuity terms
• Three consistent written positions — SL 201, SL 237, SL 262 — anchored to specific ATC language
• GP 1-04.4(5)(n): ATC implementation costs are DB’s exclusive responsibility
• Skanska’s own DB Proposal describes ATC-1 as treating the widening as a given component
• ATC-1 approval was unconditional — “The ATC is approved” with no carve-outs
• RFI 461/461.1 confirm WSDOT consistency after March 2025 — “not what the ATC was based on or approved”
• WSDOT showed flexibility on HOW (Nov 13 meeting: Pang suggested alternatives to avoid closure pour impacts)
• RFI 461 undermines reliance argument — if Comment #9 was acceptance, why submit an RFI?
• DB never submitted a DBIC despite being directed to multiple times (RFI 461, RFI 461.1, Workshop)
• Pang did not close Comment #9 — structures reviewer was not the person who closed the comment
• AECOM’s language escalates from “closed the comment” (p.2) to “confirmed acceptance” (p.7) within same document
• Type Selection Workshop: “ATC is the baseline TODAY” — WSDOT accepted 3 of 8 options
• Pat’s admission: “thought they would be ok” — DB assumed WSDOT would be flexible, not that ATC contemplated flexibility

Potential Weaknesses

• Comment #9 closure creates narrative vulnerability — but mitigated by verified RCSR text (questions omission, not neutral inquiry)
• Two-year gap now includes 4-month design reliance period (Nov 2024–Mar 2025)
• WSDOT’s initial use of “Forward Compatibility” (a non-contract term) was imprecise; corrected in SL 237 but Skanska may frame the correction as a shift
• “Match” (Item 6) is genuinely ambiguous in isolation — WSDOT’s reading requires Item 3 context (“combining”)
• DRBs tend toward compromise; panel may split the difference on scope

Pre-empted Counter-Arguments

ID	Counter-Argument	WSDOT Rebuttal
CA-1	“Forward Compatibility” withdrawal = position change	SL 237 corrected terminology, not substance. The requirement (ATC-1 Items 3+4) remained unchanged throughout. Using a non-contract label was imprecise; abandoning the label is not abandoning the requirement.
CA-2	ATC approval was unconditional — no continuity condition	The ATC text itself contains the requirement. Approval confirms the text as contract standard. Items 3+4 are self-executing — no separate condition was needed.
CA-3	Industry practice: “match” = dimensional	Contract-specific language controls over general industry usage. Item 3’s “combining” removes ambiguity. Reading “match” as dimensional-only renders Item 3 surplusage.
CA-4	Cost burden is disproportionate	Proportionality does not override explicit contract language. GP 1-04.4(5)(n) assigns ATC implementation costs to DB regardless of magnitude.

Gaps in Skanska’s Submittal

• No analysis of the word “combining” in Item 3 — Skanska’s argument depends on reading Item 3 in isolation
• Selective reading of ATC-1: focuses on title and Item 3, ignores Items 4 and 6
• No analysis of GP 1-04.4(5)(n) (ATC cost responsibility)
• Conflation of WSDOT’s terminology correction (“Forward Compatibility”) with a substantive position withdrawal
• RFI 461 undermines reliance argument — DB sought confirmation after “acceptance,” proving they knew it was disputed
• Pat’s admission (“thought they would be ok”) undercuts the ATC flexibility argument — DB assumed WSDOT would accept changes, not that ATC permitted them
• DBIC presentation title is itself an admission — DB framed its own alternative approach as a DBIC, not a contract-compliant design